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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

:

SCOTT BOWMAN,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 960372-CA
Priority No. 2

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is an appeal by a criminal defendant from judgment
of conviction entered April 29, 1996.

This Court has

jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3 (2) (e) (Supp. 1996).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW
AND PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUES
ISSUE I:

Did the trial court err in concluding that the

prosecutor's peremptory strikes of two of three minorities from
the jury panel were not purposefully discriminatory where the
prosecutor's justification for striking one juror was patently
false, and his justification for striking the other juror was not
supported by the record?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

The determination of whether a

prosecutor's strike is purposefully discriminatory generally
turns on credibility, and will not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous.

State v. Higcrinbotham, 917 P. 2d 545 (Utah 1996) .

However, while the court often refers to the standard of review

as "clearly erroneous," the issue of whether a prosecutor's
justification is pretextual is treated as a mixed question of
fact and law with proper deference given to the trial court's
assessment of credibility.

See generally State v.Cantu, 778 P.2d

517 (Utah 1989) ("Cantu II."), State v. Hiqqinbotham, 917 P.2d
545 (Utah 1996).
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE:

After each party had

exercised its peremptory challenges and prior to the jury being
sworn, defense counsel asked to approach the bench.

After a

bench conference, the trial court swore in the jury and excused
the remaining panelists.

R. 3 66.

Defense counsel, relying on

Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)
challenged the prosecutor's strikes against prospective jurors My
Dang and Frances Alires.
ISSUE II:

R. 367.

Did the trial court err by refusing to

instruct the jury, at counsel's request, that Bowman's admission
that he was the driver, which was admitted only for impeachment
purposes because of concerns that it was given to the police in
violation of Miranda, could not be used substantively?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

The issue of whether a trial judge

erred in refusing to give a requested jury instruction is a
question of law which is reviewed for correctness.

State v.

Larsen, 876 P.2d 391, 394 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), State v.
Ontiveros, 835 P.2d 201, 205 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE:

Defense counsel asked the

trial court to instruct the jury that Bowman's admission to
2

police officers could be used only for impeachment purposes and
not as substantive evidence.
ISSUE III:

R. 251.

Did the prosecutor engage in misconduct by

arguing to the jury, in response to defense counsel's comment
that the State had failed to call a material eye witness, that
the defendant had subpoena power and should have called the
missing State's witness himself?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

"The test of whether the remarks

made by counsel are so objectionable as to merit a reversal in a
criminal case is, did the remarks call to the attention of the
jurors matters which they would not be justified in considering
in determining their verdict, and were they, under the
circumstances of the particular case, probably influenced by
those remarks."

State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984).

PRESERVATION OP THE ISSUE:

Immediately after the

prosecutor commented on Bowman's failure to call the State's eye
witness, Defense counsel objected.

R. 281.

TEXT OF DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES AND RULES
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or
in the Militia, when in actual service in time of
War or public danger; nor shall any person be
subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against
3

himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of
the State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the law.
Rule 105, Utah Rules of Evidence provides:
When evidence which is admissible as to one
party or for one purpose but not admissible as to
another party or for another purpose is admitted,
the court, upon request, shall restrict the
evidence to its proper scope and instruct the
jury accordingly.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant, Scott Bowman ("Bowman"), was charged with
Failure to Respond to an officer's signal to stop, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-13.5, and Plate and
Registration Violation, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1305(5).

R. 7.

After a two-day jury

trial, Bowman was convicted of both counts on January 18, 1996.
R. 67-8.

Presiding Judge William A. Thorne sentenced Bowman to

serve a term of zero to five years on Count I, and three months
on Count II, concurrent, and suspended both upon completion of 24
4

months probation.

R. 94-95.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
I.

THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL

On August 5, 1995, at around midnight, Deputy Ann Cardon
("Cardon") with the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office was stopped
at the intersection of 2 0th East and 23rd South when she observed
a motorcycle travelling eastbound run the red light.
Cardon activated her lights and pursued the driver.

R. 140-41.
R. 144. She

lost sight of the motorcycle when it turned into a nearby
business.

R. 145. Anticipating that the driver would probably

try to come back onto 23rd East from a side street, Cardon went
to the end of the street to head the driver off.
blocked the side street with her vehicle.

R. 146.

Cardon

She then saw the

driver coming towards her down the side street.

147-48.

driver was able to maneuver the bike past the patrol car.

The
14 9.

Cardon continued to pursue the motorcycle but lost sight of him.
R. 151.
As Cardon was driving through the area looking for the
motorcycle, Kevin Mitchell ("Mitchell") approached her and said
he had seen the chase.

R. 152. Mitchell told Cardon that the

driver was the Appellant, Bowman.

R. 152-53, 172. Mitchell gave

Cardon Bowman's name, address, phone number, and birth date.
R. 153.

Mitchell was a former roommate who Bowman had kicked out

for dealing drugs.

R. 221.

given to her by Mitchell.

Deputy Cardon went to the address

In front of the apartment was a brown,
5

two-tone, Honda motorcycle.

Deputy Lenny Bruno ("Bruno") of the

Salt Lake County Sheriff's office also went to the apartment.
R. 155. He observed the motorcycle and testified that the engine
was hot. R. 192-94.
the motorcycle.
jail.

Cardon identified Bowman as the driver of

R. 156. Bowman was arrested and transported to

R. 157.
Bowman testified that he was not the driver and had not

driven his motorcycle that night.
II.

R. 218-19.

JURY SELECTION

The prospective jurors were all given questionnaires to
fill out prior to trial.

R. 114. Copies of the questionnaires

were distributed to counsel.

R. 341.

After the trial court had

questioned the prospective jurors, the prosecutor was given an
opportunity to also question the panel.

R. 341. The prosecutor

noted that some of the prospective jurors had indicated on their
questionnaires that they had family or friends that had been
charged with a criminal offense.

He asked the panel if that

experience would affect their ability to be fair and impartial.
No one responded. R. 341.
Each party used only three of their peremptory strikes
because there were not enough people left on the panel to seat a
jury after for cause strikes had been taken.

R. 69-70.

prosecutor struck prospective juror My Dang ("Ms. Dang")

The
first.

He used his second strike against Frances Alires ("Mrs. Alires").
R. 69-70.

The remaining minority member, Mr. Nadkarni, was

struck by defense counsel because he had a contractual
6

relationship with law enforcement, and had earlier that week been
struck for cause at defense counsel's request from a different
panel in a prior trial.

R. 369-70.

(A complete summary of jury

selection is included in Addendum I).
After each party had taken its peremptory strikes,
defense counsel challenged the prosecutor's strikes of Ms. Dang
and Mrs. Alires.

R. 367.

Counsel noted that Ms. Dang was a

person of Asian descent, and Mrs. Alires of Hispanic descent.
one questioned his observations.

R. 367.

Counsel

No

pointed out

that the prosecutor had not individually questioned either woman
when given the opportunity.

R. 3 67.

The prosecutor responded by

claiming that he struck Ms. Dang because when he heard her speak
he did not think she had a good command of the English language.
R. 368.

The prosecutor justified striking Mrs. Alires on the

grounds that he had prosecuted another individual with same last
name and thought they may be related.

R.

368. Defense counsel

pointed out that on the questionnaire, Mrs. Alires had stated
that she did not have any friends or family members who had been
charged with a crime.

R. 368-369.

(A copy of Mrs. Alires'

questionnaire is provided in Addendum II).
The trial court denied defense counsel's challenge
stating:
I think the case law makes fairly clear that the
challenge at least has to pose [a] race-neutral
basis. It does not, if I remember part of the
words of the Court, it doesn't have to be a good
reason, it simply has to be a neutral reason.

7

I will note for the record as well that there is
a person of obvious Indian descent who did remain
and was not stricken.
R. 369. (A copy of the transcript of the prosecutor's responses
is included in Addendum III).
III. DEFENSE COUNSEL'S REQUEST FOR A LIMITING
INSTRUCTION
Bowman testified that he had not driven his motorcycle
that night.

R. 219.

On cross examination, the prosecutor

confronted Bowman with inconsistent remarks made to the police.
Bowman stated he could not remember making many of the statements
and denied making others.
Deputy Bruno for rebuttal.

R. 227-29.

The prosecutor recalled

Bruno testified that Bowman admitted

he had run from the police because he was angry with his wife for
refusing him visitation with his children.

R. 235.

Cross-

examination revealed that Bowman's statements may have been made
in response to questions by the police, while in custody, and
without Miranda warnings.

Bruno also admitted that he had not

provided a copy of his report, which contained Bowman's
admissions, to the State or defense counsel until the day of
trial.

R. 237-40.

Deputy Cardon also testified on rebuttal that

Bowman had made similar statements to her while being transported
to the jail.

R. 24-45.

Defense counsel informed the trial court that he had not
received a copy of Bruno's report until that day.

He moved to

have Bowman's admissions stricken because they were taken in
violation of Miranda.

R. 249.

The prosecutor responded that he
8

had used the statements in rebuttal for impeachment, and the
statements were admissible for that purpose.

R. 250.

The trial

court expressed concern that some of the statements may have been
given in violation of Miranda.

R. 250.

Again, the prosecutor

noted that he had waited to use the statements in rebuttal for
impeachment.

R. 250.

At that point, defense counsel requested a

limiting instruction telling the jury they could only use
Bowman's statements for impeachment purposes.

R. 251.

The

prosecutor stated for the third time that he only used the
statements on rebuttal for impeachment, but claimed that if the
statements came in for impeachment purposes, they could also be
used substantively, even if taken in violation of Miranda.
R. 251.
The trial court, apparently wishing to avoid a mid-trial
suppression hearing on whether Bowman's statements were taken in
violation of Miranda, ruled that the statements were admissible
"as presented."

R. 252.

The trial court was apparently

referring to the prosecutor's assertion that he presented
Bowman's statements only for impeachment purposes on rebuttal.
R. 250-51.

The trial court refused defense counsel's request for

a limiting instruction.

R. 252.

The trial court stated that a

limiting instruction would only draw the attention of the jurors
to the statements.

The court also stated that the instruction

was not "critical" since the real question before the jury was
Cardon's identification of the driver.

R. 252.

(A copy of the

pertinent sections of the transcript is included in Addendum IV).
9

IV. THE PROSECUTOR'S IMPROPER REMARKS DURING
CLOSING ARGUMENT
During closing argument defense counsel argued that the
State had failed to meet its burden of proof because it did not
call Mitchell, the man who told Deputy Cardon that Bowman was the
driver, to testify.

R. 272.

Counsel questioned why the State

would fail to call a material eye witness to the stand unless it
was unsure of his credibility.

R. 272-73.

Counsel noted that

according to Bowman, Mitchell had been very angry with him for
throwing him out.

R. 273.

Counsel further argued that Cardon's

identification was tainted by Mitchell's telling her that Bowman
was the driver.

R. 274.

In response to defense counsel's attempts to show the
jury the weaknesses of the State's case, the prosecutor stated:
And so if Mr. Bowman--or [defense counsel] thinks
he's such an important witness, although he has
no responsibility to produce any evidence, he has
every opportunity to bring him in and let you
hear from him. So, if he wanted you to hear from
him, he has that opportunity-Defense counsel objected and was overruled at which point the
prosecutor continued:
Thank you, Judge. So, if--if that's such a big
deal to [defense counsel], he has every
opportunity to bring in everybody he wants, he
has the subpoena power of the Court and so he
wants you to think, boy, that's a big flaw in the
State's case.
R. 281-82.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The prosecutor's use of two-thirds of his peremptory
10

strikes to remove two-thirds of the panelists belonging to racial
minority groups violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution.

The prosecutor's justification for

removing a prospective Hispanic juror, Mrs. Alires, was a pretext
for purposeful discrimination.

His claim that he struck

Mrs. Alires because her last name was the same as someone he had
prosecuted does not merit belief because Mrs. Alires had
indicated in her jury questionnaire that she had no family or
friends who had been charged with a crime.

The prosecutor had

read the questionnaires, but never asked Mrs. Alires about her
familial ties when given the opportunity.

The prosecutor's

justification for striking Ms. Dang, a woman of Asian descent,
was also pretextual.

His claim that Ms. Dang did not have a

sufficient grasp of the English language was not supported by the
record.
The trial court erred by refusing to grant defense
counsel's request for a limiting instruction directing the jury
that they could use Bowman's admission that he had run because he
was angry with his wife only for impeachment purposes.

The

trial court had agreed to allow the admissions, even though they
may have been taken in violation of Miranda, because the State
used them only for impeachment purposes on rebuttal.

Wishing to

avoid a mid-trial suppression hearing, the trial court allowed
the admissions only for impeachment, but refused defense
counsel's request for a limiting instruction.

The State's case

against Bowman hinged on the reliability of Cardon's
11

identification of the driver.

The court's error was prejudicial

because it allowed the jury to convict Bowman without having to
evaluate the credibility of Deputy Cardon's identification.
Lastly, the prosecutor committed misconduct when during
closing argument he told the jury that Bowman had subpoena power
and should have called Mitchell.

Though Mitchell was the only

other eye witness to the crime and knew Bowman, the State did not
call him.

When confronted with this fact, the State improperly

argued that Bowman should have called the State's witness
himself.

The State's remark was improper because Mitchell was

available to the State, and his testimony could not have been
expected to be favorable to Bowman.

The effect of the State's

argument was to shift the burden of proof to Bowman, and to
invite negative speculation as to why Bowman did not call the
State's eye witness himself.

The prosecutor's comment undermined

Bowman's right to a fair trial because it shifted the jury's
focus away from the critical issue in the case, the reliability
of the State's eye witness identification, and implied that he
had the burden of proving his innocence.

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE PROSECUTOR STRUCK TWO MINORITY
JURORS FROM THE PANEL IN VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION.
In Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1717, 476 U.S.
79, 86 (1986), the Supreme Court ruled that the Equal Protection
12

Clause

forbids a prosecutor from using peremptory strikes to

remove minority jurors because of their race.

Batson was decided

in response to prior cases in lower courts which required a
defendant show proof of repeated striking of minorities over a
number of cases to establish a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause,

Id. 1720-21, 92-93.

Since this requirement placed a

"crippling burden of proof" on the defendant, the Court
recognized that prosecutors were able to use peremptory strikes
in a discriminatory and unconstitutional manner without risk of
judicial scrutiny of their actions. Jd.

Batson sought to

address this problem by allowing a defendant to make a prima
facie showing of racial discrimination by relying solely on the
facts surrounding jury selection in his case.

Also, "the

defendant is entitled to rely on the fact, as to which there can
be no dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute a jury
selection practice that permits 'those to discriminate who are of
a mind to discriminate.'"

Id. at 1722-23, 95-96.

Discriminatory jury selection harms not only the
defendant, but also harms the excluded juror and the community as
a whole.

Id. at 1718, 89.

"Racial discrimination in the

selection of jurors casts doubt on the integrity of the judicial
process and places the fairness of a criminal proceeding in
doubt."

The jury acts as a check against the enormous power

prosecutors wield in the name of the State. When the process by
which the jury is selected is tainted, confidence in the jury as
a safeguard of the people is undermined.
13

Since the very means by

which the jury was selected was unfair, public confidence in the
verdict is eroded.

Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411-413, 113 L.

Ed. 2d 411, 425-26, 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991).
A prosecutor's wrongful exclusion of a juror by a
race-based peremptory challenge is a
constitutional violation committed in open court
at the outset of the proceedings. The overt
wrong, often apparent to the entire jury panel,
casts doubt over the obligation of the parties,
the jury, and indeed the court to adhere to the
law throughout the trial of the cause.
Id. at 413, 426.

Because the juror who is excluded also has been

wronged, but will seldom litigate, the criminal defendant has
third party standing to raise the claim on his or her behalf.
Id. at 415-16, 428.
In order to establish a claim under Batson, the defendant
must make a showing of purposeful discrimination.

Batson set up

an analysis that shifted the burden of proof from the defendant
to the State upon a prima facie showing of discrimination.

Most

jurisdictions, including Utah, then required that the State's
justification for the strike be (1) neutral, (2) related to the
case being tried, (3) clear and reasonably specific, and (4)
legitimate.

State v. Hiaainbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 548 (Utah

1996) .
The United States Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed
the principles behind Batson, but has clarified the burden the
State must meet to rebut a prima facie showing of discrimination.
Purkett v. Elem, 115 S. Ct. 1769, 131 L. Ed. 2d 834 (1995).
Under our Batson jurisprudence, once the opponent
of a peremptory challenge has made out a prima
facie case of racial discrimination (step 1 ) , the
14

burden of production shifts to the proponent of
the strike to come forward with a race-neutral
explanation (step 2) . If a race-neutral
explanation is tendered, the trial court must
then decide (step 3) whether the opponent of the
strike has proved purposeful discrimination.
Id. at 1771.
Now, under Purkett, any facially neutral explanation will
serve to rebut a prima facie showing of discrimination.
review does not stop here, however.

Judicial

At step three, the court

must determine whether the reason given by the State was a
pretext for purposeful discrimination.

The effect of Elem was

not to preclude meaningful judicial review of the legitimacy of
the justification for the strike.

Elem merely focuses the

court's review of the plausibility of the prosecutor's
explanation at step 3, rather than step 2.

At step 3,

"implausible or fantastic justifications may and probably will be
found to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination."

.Id. at

1771.
A.

MARSHALLING REQUIREMENT

To establish a Batson claim, the appellant must "marshal
all of the evidence in support of the trial court's finding, and
then demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the
findings against an attack."

Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 548.

State justified striking Mrs. Alires from the panel because he
was prosecuting someone else by that name and thought
Mrs. Alires might be related to that person.
15

That person had

The

allegedly given stolen property to her relatives.

R. 369-69.

If

Mrs. Alires were related to someone the prosecutor was currently
charging, he would be understandably concerned about possible
hostile feelings towards the State.

If she were involved in

suspected criminal conduct, the State would also have a
legitimate reason to strike her from the panel.

Also, the

prosecutor claimed not to know if Alires was a member of a
minority group.

R. 3 68-69.x

The State justified striking Ms. Dang on the grounds that
after hearing her speak, she did not appear to have a good
command of the English language.

R. 368.

Both the State and the

trial judge had the opportunity to hear Ms. Dang answer briefly
questions about her marital status, occupation and residence.
R. 330.

Though the State did not question Ms. Dang further when

it had the chance, the prosecutor stated that he did not want to
embarrass Ms. Dang by questioning her further.

R. 368.

The trial court noted that the State had not struck one
person of obvious Indian descent from the panel.

Lastly, the

trial court had an opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
prosecutor in assessing the genuineness of his responses.
B. THOUGH BOWMAN IS NOT REQUIRED TO MAKE A PRIMA
FACIE SHOWING OF DISCRIMINATION BECAUSE THE STATE
DID NOT RAISE THE ISSUE IN THE TRIAL COURT, THE
PROSECUTOR'S USE OF TWO-THIRDS OF ITS STRIKES TO
REMOVE TWO OUT OF THREE OF THE MINORITY MEMBERS
FROM THE PANEL ESTABLISHES A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF
DISCRIMINATION.
x

.
See Section II of the Statement of Facts for additional
details. For a summary of jury selection, see Addendum I.
16

If the party exercising the peremptory strike does not
challenge the sufficiency of his opponent's prima facie case at
trial, and instead offers an explanation to rebut the claim of
discrimination, the reviewing court will not address the issue of
whether a prima facie case was established on appeal.
Higglnbothgm, 917 P.2d at 547; State v. Macial. 854 p.2d 543, 545
(Utah Ct. App. 1993); State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 777 (Utah
Ct. App. 1991).

Once the proponent of the strike attempts to

rebut the claim of discrimination, the question of whether a
prima facie case was established is irrelevant.

The reviewing

court then proceeds to the next step to determine if a race
neutral explanation was given, and if so, was it merely a pretext
masking a discriminatory purpose. Id.
In this case, the State did not challenge Bowman's claim
that he had established a prima facie case of discrimination.
R. 368.

Instead, the prosecutor attempted to rebut the claim of

discrimination by offering what he claimed was a race neutral
explanation for the strikes.

R. 368.

Even though Bowman is not required to make a. prima facie
showing of purposeful discrimination, there is none the less
sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case.

in order to

establish a prima facie case, the defendant must present
sufficient evidence to support an inference of purposeful
discrimination.

Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1721, 476 U.S. at 92. The

trial court should consider all the relevant circumstances.
pattern of strikes against minority jurors, the prosecutor's
17

A

questions and statements during voir dire, and the fact that the
exercise of peremptory strikes is subject to abuse are all
factors the court should consider.

Id. at 1722-23; 96-97.

Utah

Courts have provided further guidance in determining whether the
opponent of the strike has established a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination:
The elements necessary to such a prima facie case
include (1) as complete a record as possible, (2)
a showing that persons excluded belong to a
cognizable group . . .and (3) a showing that
there exists "a strong likelihood that such
persons are being challenged because of their
group association rather than because of any
specific bias.
State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450, 456 (Utah 1994).
In this case, Bowman has met his burden of establishing a
prima facie case of discrimination.
complete for review.
strikes.

The record is sufficiently

The prosecutor offered explanations for his

Because the trial judge noted the presence of other

minority members on the panel in his ruling, the racial makeup of
the jury panel after "for cause" strikes were made by the court
is known.

R. 3 69.
Both Ms. Dang and Mrs. Alires are members of cognizable

racial groups.

Defense counsel noted for the record that

Ms. Dang was a person of Asian descent, and that Mrs. Alires was
of Hispanic descent.

R. 367.

Lastly, the fact that the State used its first two out of
three strikes to remove two-thirds of the minorities from the
panel establishes an inference of purposeful discrimination.
A disproportionate number of strikes against minority members,
18
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at 458.

Noting that "trial courts should consider

disproportionate impact as circumstantial evidence of invidious
intent," this Court held that as a matter of law the defendant
had established a prima facie case.

JEc|. at 462.

In this case, there were three minorities left on the
panel after for cause strikes had been made, Mrs. Alires,
Ms. Dang, and Mr. Nadkarni.

T. 69-70.

The State used three

quarters of its strikes against minorities and was responsible
for the removal of three quarters of the minorities from the
panel.

The prosecutor used his first two strikes to remove

Ms. Dang and Mrs. Alires.

He did not question either prospective

juror when given an opportunity to do so.2

As in Pharris, the

fact that the prosecutor used a disproportionate number of his
strikes to remove minorities, struck most of the minorities from
the panel, and did not individually question either Mrs. Alires
or Ms. Dang establishes an inference of purposeful
discrimination.
C. THE PROSECUTOR'S JUSTIFICATION FOR STRIKING
MRS. ALIRES FROM THE PANEL WAS A PRETEXT FOR
PURPOSEFUL DISCRIMINATION.
Elem held that any facially neutral explanation to a
Batson challenge would suffice to rebut a prima facie showing of
discrimination.

However, the Court did not abdicate all

meaningful review of the persuasiveness of the prosecutor's
explanation.

It is at the "third step that the persuasiveness of

2

. The only minority the State didn't strike, Mr. Nadkarni,
had ties with law enforcement. R. 369-70.
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these factors will tend to show that the state's
reasons are not actually supported by the record
or are an impermissible pretext:
(1) alleged
group bias not shown to be shared by the juror in
question, (2) failure to examine the juror or
perfunctory examination, assuming neither the
trial court nor opposing counsel had questioned
the juror, (3) singling the juror out for special
questioning designed to evoke a certain respon se,
3

Hiqginbotham was decided after Elem, yet tl I = Utal I Si ipr erne
Court cited to its prior analysis in Cantu II.

(4) the prosecutor's reason is unrelated to the
facts of the case, and (5) a challenge based on
reasons equally applicable to juror [sic] who
were not challenged.
Cantu II, 778 P.2d at 518-19 (quoting State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d
18, 22 (Fla. 1988) .
In this case, the State's reason for striking Mrs. Alires
conflicted with the information the prosecutor had regarding her.
If the prosecutor for some reason thought Mrs. Alires had lied
about her relatives in her questionnaire, why didn't he ask her
about it when he had the opportunity to do so?

The prosecutor

noted that some jurors had indicated on their questionnaires that
they had family members who had been accused of crimes.

He then

asked the entire panel if any experience like that would affect
their judgment.

No one raised their hands.4

R. 341.

The

prosecutor could have followed up on that line of questioning
with Mrs. Alires.

He could easily have asked her again about her

family ties without embarrassment or accusation if he was
genuinely concerned that she was related to the person he had
prosecuted.

If through questioning he could establish that

Mrs. Alires was related to this individual, and had
misrepresented this information on the questionnaire, she would
have likely been struck for cause.5
4

.
All of the prospective jurors who indicated they had
family members who had been charged with crimes were struck for
cause by the court. R. 69-70, 114.
5

. If the prosecutor genuinely believed Mrs. Alires had lied
on her questionnaire, he logically would have questioned her
further to try and establish a for cause strike.
Most trial
attorneys will attempt to strike unwanted jurors for cause first,
22
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Brannen Smith and ¥vonne j a c o bsen both bHivtj ua the jury.
Botn indicated on their questionnaires that they had no family
members charged with a crime, R. 114.
7

. The prosecutor claimed he did i lot know Mrs Aiires was a
minority or that Aiires is an Hispanic surname. R. 368, 370, The
trial court's ruling implies that the court accepted defense
counsel's observation that Mrs. Aiires appeared to be of Hispanic
descent and carried an Hispanic surname.
If Mrs. Aiires was
clearly not Hispanic, one can assume the trial court would have
noted such an obvious and pertinent fact.
R. 36 9,
It is not
unreasonable to assume that anyone who had dealt with the Hispanic
community would be aware that Aiires was an Hispanic name.
In
fact, the prosecutor indicated he was in the process of charging an
individual with the last name Aiires. Also, in Cantu, this very
prosecutor helped supplement the jury panel in that case with
persons randomly chosen from the master jury list because of their
Hispanic surnames. Cantu II, 778 P.2d at 517.
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the proponent of the strike.

Because credibility is an issue of

fact that often involves an assessment of the demeanor of the
attorney exercising the strike, the U.S. Supreme Court has held
that absent "exceptional circumstances" the trial court's factual
findings are entitled to great deference.

Hernandez, 111 S. Ct.

at 1870, 500 U.S. at 366.
Utah Courts have favored a more refined approach to
applying an appropriate standard of review.8

A review of

Batson cases in this State reveal that while the courts often
refer to the standard of review as "clearly erroneous," the issue
of whether a prosecutor's justification is pretextual is treated
as a mixed question of fact and law.9
For example, the trial court's assessment of credibility
is especially important when the proponent of the strike offers a
subjective impression to justify the strike.
Hiqqinbotham, 917 P.2d at 548.10

See e.g.

In those instances the

8

.
Issues of standard of review are a matter of state law.
Absent a direct federal mandate, Utah courts are not bound by
federal standards of review. State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1268
(Utah 1993) .
9

. This approach is also judicially sound. While the trial
court is in a unique position to determine factual disputes, "the
appellate court addresses itself to the clarity and correctness of
the developing law in order to provide unambiguous direction to
those whose further rights and responsibilities are affected."
Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1271.
10

. In Hiqqinbotham, the prosecutor justified her strike of
a minority juror by stating that she felt the juror was looking at
her in a hostile manner. 917 P. 2d at 546. The Utah Supreme Court
applied a clearly erroneous standard to the trial court's
assessment of the genuineness of the prosecutor's explanation for
the strike, id. at 548.
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.
Elem does not change the result in Cantu, it merely
focuses the court's review of the legitimacy of the strike in step
three rather than step two.
12

. Appellate judges "wltl I thei r collective experience and
their broader perspective" are in a better position than the trial
courts to define the law and provide "statewide standards that
guide law enforcement and prosecutorial officials." Thurman, 846
P.2d at 1272.
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1769 at 1775 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

Elem does not require

reviewing courts tolerate implausible explanations for strikes
against minorities.

Elem does not foreclose the situation where

a reviewing court moves to step three of the analysis to
determine that an implausible justification wholly unrelated to
the case is pretextual as a matter of law.

As Justice Stevens

observed, "even this Court would acknowledge that some
implausible, fantastic and silly explanations could be found to
be pretextual without any further evidence."

Id.

In this case, the prosecutor's justification for striking
Mrs. Alires was not based on a subjective impression of her
fitness as a juror.

He gave an objective reason which was not

merely unsupported by a silent record, but was in direct
contradiction to the facts known about the juror.

The

prosecutor's reason necessarily involved a belief that
Mrs. Alires was lying.

Such a belief is discriminatory itself.

When a prosecutor's justification for striking a minority juror
appears to be untrue based upon the juror's answers on voir dire,
it should be rejected outright, just as the court would reject a
justification like, "she was wearing a blue shirt."

Bowman urges

this Court to hold that under these narrow circumstances, the
prosecutor's justification for striking Mrs. Alires was
pretextual as a matter of law.

E. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE STRIKE
AGAINST MRS. ALIRES WAS NOT A RESULT OF
PURPOSEFUL DISCRIMINATION WAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
26
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This Court rejected the trial court's reasoning noting that

13

. This case is distinguishable from Harrison. Unlike this
case, in Harrison, the defendant did not establish a prima facie
case of discrimination. N o r did he argue to the trial court the
prosecutor's lack of meaningful voir dire.
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"because a single challenge based on race is impermissible . . .
neither fact is dispositive of the issue of discrimination in the
removal of other jurors."

846 P.2d at 465 (quoting State v.

Cantu, 750 P.2d 591, 597 (Utah 1988).

Similarly, in this case,

the fact that the prosecutor did not strike the last remaining
minority on the panel does not support the conclusion that his
strike against Mrs. Alires was not racially motivated.
As in Cantu II, the record in this case does not support
the trial court's finding of no discriminatory purpose.
II,

In Cantu

the court held "the prosecutor's desultory voir dire,

uninvolved demeanor, and failure to pursue a studied or
deliberate course of questioning regarding specific bias,
together with his stated reasons that the challenge was made in
anger are enough to fulfill the requirements of Batson."
P.2d at 519.

778

Similarly, in this case the prosecutor wholly

failed to pursue any meaningful voir dire examination of
Mrs. Alires.

His stated reason was contrary to the information

provided by Mrs. Alires.

He had no reason to believe that she

was related to the person he had prosecuted other than the fact
that their last names were the same, and absolutely no objective
reason to believe Mrs. Alires was a liar.

If a prosecutor can

justify striking a minority juror on grounds that directly
conflict with the facts, then the protections of Batson are
illusory.

Prosecutors who are inclined to discriminate will be

given a green flag to simply adopt rote facially neutral

28

r*=-sr-:=:es L O conceal invidious motives.
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dissenting).

F. THE STATE'S STRIKE AGAINST MRS. ALIRES IN
VIOLATION OF BATSON REQUIRES REVERSAL.
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G. THE PROSECUTOR'S JUSTIFICATION FOR STRIKING
MS. DANG FROM THE PANEL WAS A PRETEXT FOR
PURPOSEFUL DISCRIMINATION.
The prosecutor exercised his first strike against
Ms. Dana.
the

p . -t-:rr

• woman c: Asian desce.\
€

b9-~'0.

When challenged,
I

Judge, with respect to the--Ms. Dang, when I
heard her speak, I W H S concerned about the
language problem.
LL had nothing to do with her
race, she said she's been here six years, and
when I listened, and I didn't want to embarrass
her by probing into that, when 1 listened to her
questions (sic), I thought,, I'm not so sure that
29

her command of the English language is what I
would prefer; had nothing to do with her race.
R. 47: 5-12.
the record.

The prosecutor's justification is not supported by
Initially, the trial court asked all the jurors to

state their name, where they lived, their employment, marital
status and spouse's employment.

R. 4.

The transcript of

Ms. Dang's responses is partially incomplete because Ms. Dang was
soft spoken and the recording was of poor quality.

R. 330.

However, a review of the actual video tape of the
proceedings and the written record show that Ms. Dang gave all
the information requested by the trial judge in the order
requested.14

She apparently had no trouble understanding the

judge's compound question.

She did not appear to falter, or

speak in grammatically incorrect phrases.
seemed to have only a slight accent.

R. 330.

Indeed, she

The fact that she had a

slight accent does not mean she had a poor command of the English
language.
In Cantu II, the court based its reversal in part on the
fact that the prosecutor's voir dire of the stricken juror was
"both desultory and insufficient to establish any specific bias
on the part of the jurors."
were very brief.

778 P.2d at 519.

Ms. Dang's answers

If the prosecutor were genuinely concerned

14

. The proceedings in this case were recorded on video tape.
Though written transcripts are prepared for the convenience of the
parties and Court, the actual video tape remains the official
record of the proceedings. For this reason, it is appropriate for
Bowman to refer the Court to the actual video tape in assessing
whether the prosecutor's justification for striking Ms. Dang was
pretextual.
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Though he had the opportunity,

the prosecutor chose not to question Ms. Dang.

H. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE STRIKE
AGAINST MS. DANG WAS NOT A RESULT OF PURPOSEFUL
DISCRIMINATION WAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS REQUIRING
REVERSAL OF BOWMAN'S CONVICTION.
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a pretext for purposeful discrimination. Because the trial
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court's ruling was clearly erroneous, Bowman's conviction should
be reversed and remanded with orders that he be given a new
trial.
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO
INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT BOWMAN'S STATEMENTS
ADMITTED FOR IMPEACHMENT PURPOSES ONLY COULD NOT
BE USED AS EVIDENCE OF HIS GUILT.
A. THE TRIAL COURT WAS REQUIRED TO GIVE A
LIMITING INSTRUCTION.
In order to avoid a mid-trial suppression hearing on
whether Bowman's admissions were given in violation of Miranda,
the trial court allowed Bowman's admissions to remain in evidence
since the prosecutor only used them for impeachment in his
rebuttal.

Since the trial court chose to avoid the Miranda issue

raised by defense counsel and allow the statements in under
Harris v. New York, 91 S. Ct. 643, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), Bowman
was entitled to a limiting instruction informing the jury that
the admissions could only be used for impeachment and not as
evidence of guilt.
In Harris, the United State's Supreme Court held that
statements taken in violation of Miranda could be used for
impeachment purposes to attack a defendant's testimony at trial.
91 S. Ct. at 646, 401 U.S. at 226.
910 P.2d 1182, 1190 (Utah 1995).

See also, State v. Trover,

Evidence taken in violation of

Miranda is not admissible as substantive evidence in the
prosecutor's case in chief.

If statements taken in violation of

Miranda are allowed under Harris, they are admissible solely for
32
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h o l d i n g in large par t o n the fact that the defendant d i d n o t
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request an instruction, and the evidence was used only in
rebuttal to impeach the defendant's testimony.

Id.

Both Gardner and Ayala support the proposition that had
the defendant requested a limiting instruction, the trial court
would be obligated to give it.

A trial court has a duty to

instruct the jury on the law applicable to the facts of the case.
State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75, 58 (Utah 1981).

Additionally, Rule

105, Utah Rules of Evidence states:
When evidence which is admissible as to one party
or for one purpose but not admissible as to
another party or for another purpose is admitted,
the court, upon request, shall restrict the
evidence to its proper scope and instruct the
jury accordingly.
The term "shall" is generally presumed mandatory rather than
discretionary.

Jones v. Bountiful City Corp., 834 P.2d 556, 559

(Utah Ct. App. 1992).
For example, State v. Smith, 700 P.2d 1106, 1110 (Utah
1985)

held that the trial court erred in refusing to grant

counsel's request for an instruction cautioning the jury that
evidence of the defendant's juvenile conviction could be
considered only in connection with the issue of identity.

In

State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338, 1352 (Utah 1977) the court held
that it was error to fail to give a limiting instruction as to
the proper use of a non testifying co-defendant's statements at
trial.

And State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069, 1075 (Utah 1987)

held that the defendant is entitled to a limiting instruction
upon request that admission of evidence of other crimes may be
considered only for the limited purpose for which it is
34
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B. THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO GIVE A LIMITING
INSTRUCTION WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR BECAUSE IT
ALLOWED THE JURY TO CONVICT BOWMAN WITHOUT
WEIGHING THE STRENGTH OF THE STATE'S EYE WITNESS
IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE.
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She testified on direct that she saw the driver's face for
approximately 5 seconds.

R. 148.

night when the chase took place.

It was approximately 11:40 at
Cardon was approaching the end

of her shift and had been working since 2:00 p.m.

R.

159.

She

stated that during the chase her "adrenaline was pumping."
R. 168.
Cardon testified that her initial description of the
motorcycle broadcast over the radio to dispatch did not include
the make or model of the motorcycle.
detailed description of the bike.

She did not provide a

The only details Cardon was

able to give to dispatch to described the bike was that it was
mid-size and brown. R. 160. She could not tell whether the
motorcycle had a license plate.

R. 161.

a two tone brown, 1000 cc Honda.

R. 208.

Bowman's motorcycle was
It was a big touring

bike with large chrome exhaust pipes, and had a clear and silver
Veter Ghost faring.
the bike.

R. 217.

The Honda insignia was displayed on

R. 173.

Cardon testified that she observed the driver's clothing
and told dispatch the driver was wearing shorts and a tank top.
However, other deputies, based on her description of the driver
to dispatch, pulled over another man on a motorcycle wearing long
pants and a long sleeved shirt shortly after the chase.

R. 161-

162.
Bowman's statement to the deputies that he ran because
he was angry with his ex-wife was offered by the prosecutor and
admitted by the trial court for impeachment purposes because of
36

potential Miranda problems.

R. 136.

The critical issue at trial

was the reliability of Cardon's eye witness identification of the
driver.

Used substantively, Bowman's statement amounted to a

tacit admission that he was the driver.

Without an instruction

limiting the use of the statements to impeachment, the jury could
simply rely on the admission as substantive proof that Bowman was
indeed the driver.

By allowing the State to argue the evidence

substantively, the jury did not have to consider the reliability
of Cardon's identification.15

If the jury had been properly

instructed that the evidence was only to be used for impeachment
purposes, the jury could have found Bowman's credibility lacking,
but still have decided that the State had not met its burden of
proof because the eye witness identification was unreliable.
Bowman was prejudiced by the trial court's refusal to properly
instruct the jury because the trial court's ruling allowed the
jury to avoid having to weigh the eye witness identification
evidence against the State's burden of proving its case beyond a
reasonable doubt.

For that reason, the trial court's error was

not harmless and Bowman's conviction should be reversed and
remanded for a new trial.

POINT III. THE PROSECUTOR COMMITTED MISCONDUCT
WHEN HE STATED DURING CLOSING ARGUMENT THAT
BOWMAN COULD HAVE SUBPOENAED A KEY STATE'S
WITNESS HIMSELF.

15

. Despite the fact that the statements were admitted for
impeachment purposes only, the prosecutor argued the evidence
substantively in closing argument. R. 283.
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The prosecutor's statement that the defendant could have
subpoenaed Mitchell, the witness who initially told the police
that Bowman was the driver of the motorcycle, was improper and
prejudicial.

It is generally improper to comment on a

defendant's failure to call a witness.
P.2d 881 (Nevada 1996).

Whitney v. State, 915

However, under some narrow circumstances

the prosecutor may comment on the defendant's failure to call a
witness.

Under the "missing witness inference" a prosecutor may

call attention to the defendant's failure to call a witness if
the witness is peculiarly within the control of the defendant and
could reasonably be expected to give favorable testimony in
support of the defendant's theory of his defense.

Graves v.

United States. 14 S. Ct. 40, 41, 150 U.S. 118 (1893); State v.
Smith, 706 P.2d 1052, 1057 (Utah 1985), Gilbert v. State, 891
P.2d 228, 230 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).

When the missing witness

could logically be expected to materially support the defense,
and is essentially available only to the defendant, the inference
can fairly be drawn that the witness's testimony would not have
been favorable to the defendant and that is why the witness was
not called.
Some courts have adopted a looser approach and no longer
require a showing that the witness was peculiarly within the
control of the defendant.

These courts allow the negative

inference whenever the witness's testimony would naturally be
expected to be favorable to the defense.
230.

Gilbert, 891 P.2d at

Utah has favored the more traditional approach and does not
38

allow comment on a missing witness if the witness was available
to both parties.

Smith, 706 P.2d at 1057.

A witness is

peculiarly within the power of a defendant to produce if the
witness is physically available only to the defendant, or has the
type of relationship with the defendant that "pragmatically
renders his testimony unavailable" to the State. Id.
In State v. Thompson, 776 P.2d 48, 49-50 (Utah 1989), the
court held that the prosecutor improperly commented on the
defendant's failure to call a witness because the witness was
equally accessible to both parties and her testimony was not
material to the defense.

Similarly, the prosecutor's comment in

this case fails to meet the criteria necessary to support a
negative missing witness inference.
available to the State.
address.

R. 173.

The missing witness was

Mitchell gave the police his home

Mitchell was a prosecution witness, not a

defense witness, and was listed as a State's witness in the
police reports.

R. 281.

Mitchell could not logically be

expected to provide testimony favorable to the defendant.

This

witness approached police officers, told them that he had
witnessed the chase, knew the driver, and the driver was Bowman.
Also, Bowman testified that Mitchell held a grudge against him
for throwing him out of the apartment.

R. 221-22.

The prosecutor's improper comment had the effect of
shifting the burden of proof to the defendant.

When the

prosecutor was faced with Bowman's contention that because it had
failed to call a material eye witness it had not proved its case
39

beyond a reasonable doubt, the prosecutor responded by trying to
shift the burden of proof back to the defendant to explain the
absence of the witness.

R. 272-73; 281.

Since the prosecutor's

comment did not fall within the scope of the missing witness
inference, the only inference left for the jury to make was that
it was Bowman's responsibility to prove his innocence by calling
the witness himself.
This case is nearly identical to Whitney.

In Whitney,

the defendant pointed out in closing argument that the prosecutor
had failed to call material witnesses.

915 P.2d at 882.

The

State responded by arguing that the defendant should have called
the witnesses himself.

Ld.

The Nevada Supreme Court held:

It is generally also outside the boundaries of
proper argument to comment on a defendant's
failure to call a witness. This can be viewed as
impermissibly shifting the burden of proof to the
defense. Such shifting is improper because 'it
suggests to the jury that it was the defendant's
burden to produce proof by explaining the absence
of witnesses or evidence. This implication is
clearly inaccurate.'
Id. (citations omitted).

See also, Ross v. State, 803 P.2d 1104

(Nev. 1990) (prosecutor's comment on defendant's failure to call
a witness improperly shifted the burden of proof to the
defendant.)16
16

. This case is distinguishable from Smith. In Smith, the
defendant improperly commented on the State's failure to call
witnesses. The trial court instructed the jury to ignore counsel's
remarks because the witnesses were available to the defense and
were not witnesses to the crime charged. The court held that the
trial judge's statements regarding why the missing witness
inference was inappropriate did not shift the burden of proof. In
this case, the prosecutor improperly argued the missing witness
inference.
40

The prosecutor prefaced his remarks by stating that
the defendant had no responsibility to produce evidence.

R. 281.

However, after making this disclaimer, the prosecutor immediately
asked the jury to infer that it was the defendant's
responsibility to produce the missing witness.

R. 281.

The

prosecutor's disclaimer does not render his improper argument
harmless.

Indeed it demonstrates that the prosecutor knew that

his comment amounted to an improper shifting of the burden of
proof and nevertheless intentionally made the improper argument.
In Clum v. State, 893 P.2d 1277, 1279 (Alaska Ct. App.
1995) the prosecutor improperly commented on the defendant's
failure to call a witness, and prefaced his comments with a
similar disclaimer.

The court in Clum noted, "Thus, the

prosecutor asked the jury to draw the very inference that he
disavowed . . . When the prosecutor's disclaimer is evaluated in
light of the argument that followed, it proves as misleading as
Marc Antony's protestation that he had come to bury Caesar, not
to praise him."

Xd.

Similarly, in this case the prosecutor's

prefatory disclaimer was merely a disingenuous rhetorical device
that does not in any way ameliorate the harmful effect of his
subsequent argument.
The harm was further exacerbated by the prosecutor's
comment that Bowman had the same right to subpoena witnesses to
trial as the State.

R. 281.

It is not proper for the State to

comment on the defendant's opportunity to subpoena witnesses.
State v. Johnson, 760 P.2d 760, 762 (Mont. 1988); Bland v. State,
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803 P.2d 856, 862 (Alaska 1990).

"The State has the burden of

proof, and whether or not the defense subpoenaed a witness is
irrelevant."

Bland, 803 P.2d at 862.

In determining whether the jury was influenced by a
prosecutor's improper remarks, the court will examine the
evidence of the defendant's guilt.

In a case where "the

conclusion of the jurors is based on their weighing conflicting
evidence or evidence susceptible of differing interpretations,
there is a greater likelihood that they will be improperly
influenced through remarks of counsel."
329, 334 (Utah 1991).

State v. Span, 819 P.2d

In such cases there is a greater chance

that the jury's verdict was influenced by counsel's improper
argument.

.Id.

When a prosecutor improperly argues the missing witness
inference, the effect is to encourage speculation, to shift the
burden of proof, and to ask the jury to draw a negative inference
against the defendant which is not supported by the evidence.
The practical effect of the improper argument is to unfairly
undermine the defense theory.

Additionally, jurors tend to have

confidence in the prosecutor's office to pursue justice fairly
and in good faith.

A prosecutor's insinuations and assertions

are apt to carry a great deal of weight with a jury when in fact
they should carry not weight at all.

Berger v. United States,

295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S. Ct. 629, 633 (1935).

For these reasons

reversal is often warranted when a prosecutor improperly comments
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on the defendant's failure to call a witness.17
In this case, the prosecutor called the juror's attention
to inappropriate material.

It was unfair for the prosecutor to

faijl to call a material eye witness to the chase, and then ask
the jury to draw a negative inference against Bowman because he
did not call the witness.

The negative inference the prosecutor

asked the jury to draw from the defendant's failure to call the
State's witness was not fairly supported by the evidence.

The

prosecutor's argument encouraged the jury to speculate on matters
not in evidence and tended to shift their focus away from the
weakness of the State's eye witness identification evidence.
This case is distinguishable from Thompson.

In Thompson,

the prosecutor made one improper remark about the failure of the
defendant to call a minor witness.

The witness presumably would

have helped establish the defendant's claim that the victim had
an opportunity to seek help during the alleged kidnapping, but
did not do so.

The court found no prejudice for several reasons.

0n£, the defendant ignored the prosecutor's remark and did not
seek a remedy.
witness.

Two, the missing witness was not a material

Therefore, the defense's theory was not seriously

prejudiced by the negative inference, because the defendant had
other opportunities throughout the trial to make the same point

17

. See e.g. Whitney v. State, 915 P.2d 881 (Nev. 1996) ; Ross
v. State, 803 P.2d 1104 (Nev. 1990); Gilbert v. State, 891 P.2d 228
(Alaska Ct. App. 1995); Clum v. State, 893 P.2d 1277 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1995); State v. Suarez, 670 P.2d 1192 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983);
United States v. Arendale, 444 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1971); Graves v.
United States, 14 S.Ct. 40, 150 U.S. 118 (1893).
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the missing witness would have made had she testified.

Three,

the slight prejudice of one passing remark was offset by jury
instructions that the defendant is innocent until proven guilty,
and statements of counsel are not evidence.
In this case, the outcome of the trial turned on the
jury's assessment of the strength of Deputy Cardon's
identification.

Mitchell was the major eye witness to the crime.

Since he knew Bowman and saw the chase, his testimony was
critical.

The defense theorized that because Mitchell bore a

grudge against Bowman, he had misinformed the police.

This

erroneous information tainted Deputy Cardon's subsequent
identification.

Unlike Thompson, a determination of this issue

was critical to the verdict.

When viewed in conjunction with

the trial court's error in allowing the jury to improperly use
Bowman's statements substantively, the cumulative error was too
prejudicial for the jury instructions to offset.
The combination of the court's refusal to give a limiting
instruction and the prosecutor's misconduct deprived Bowman of
fair trial.

The total effect was to divert the jury's attention

from the critical task of evaluating the weakness of the State's
eye witness identification evidence.

Therefore, Bowman's

conviction should be reversed and remanded for a new trial.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Appellant respectfully
requests this Court reverse his convictions on both counts and
remand the case to the trial court with orders for a new trial.

SUBMITTED this Hit

day of November, 1996.

trffa 7kC\&C.i*£*J

-fbry- REBECCA C . HYD: V
P

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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Attorney fox Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM I

SUMMARY OF JURY SELECTION
JURORS STRUCK FOR CAUSE:
1. Laurie Packard:
She stated she had commitments out of
town for the next ten days. R. 325-26. She had ties to law
enforcement, but stated that she could objectively evaluate a
police officer's testimony; would be influenced by an
experience with a dishonest police officer. R. 351.
2. Judy Cash: Felt that the defendant must have been doing
something wrong or he would not have been charged. R. 34 9.
3.
Richard Acey:
Expressed opinion that defendant
probably guilty because he was charged. R. 350.

is

4. Victor Coloroso: Has friends in law enforcement; is an
ex-police officer; tends to put a great deal of trust in
police officers; would believe the testimony of a police
officer over a citizen. R. 355.
5. Anita Pedersen: Husband is a police officer; would not
automatically believe testimony of a police officer. R. 334,
344.
6.

George Maxwell:

Friend of defense counsel.

R. 33 6.

PROSECUTOR'S PEREMPTORY STRIKES IN ORDER THAT TAKEN:
1.

My Dang

2.

Frances Alires

3. Susan Lawrence
DEFENDANT'S PEREMPTORY STRIKES IN ORDER THAT TAKEN:
1.

Melvin Sadler

2.

Nancy Bowles-Reading

3.

Sudhir Nadkarni

JURORS
1.

Brannen Smith

2.

Donald Roden

3.

Douglas Coleby

4.

Edward Mika

5.

Shirley Parman

6.

Monte Ring

7.

Yvonne Jacobsen

8.

Dean Selack

ADDENDUM I I

JURY QUESTIONNAIRE - CRIMINAL CASE
THIRD DISTRICT COURT - JUDGE THORNE

NAME y^ntP

X

flQjrcX-,

CITY/COMMUNITY A • ^

C ,

EDUCATION YRS COMPLETED /.")
COLLEGE DEGREE

{) (}

HS DIPLOMA? YES / NO LOCATION
MAJOR

OCCUPATION T / ^ ^ € r 4 n V
MARITAL STATUS

^ s

YRS IN SL COUNTYJ&.

SCHOOL

EMPLOYER Jfr^^Ql"
NUMBER OF CHILDREN •?

OaC^

. KW.

AGES ?? - ?g~ J*-)

PREVIOUS SERVICE AS A JUROR? YES llSd WHERE? WHEN?
ARE YOU RELATED TO OR CLOSE FRIENDS WITH A LAW ENFORCEMENT
OFFICIAL? YES <NO)
NAME AND AGENCY
NAME AND AGENCY
HAVE YOU / A CLOSE FRIENjPiFAMILY MEMBER EVER BEEN THE VICTIM OF A
CRIMINAL OFFENSE? YES J^g)
WHAT CRIME?
YEAR?

WHERE2

WHAT CRIME?
YEAR?

WHERE!

HAVE YOU / FAMILY MEMBER BEEN CHARGED WITH AN OFFENSE? YES {NQ.
IF SO, WHAT?

YEAR?

WHERE?

JJFSO.WHAT?

YEAR?

WHERE?

IS THERE A REASON YOU WOULD BE UNABLE TO SERVE ON A JURY TODAY?

•i/zL
I hereby swear that the above information is true - •••'/•> •*'. * ,\--> / • / / > n ^—
Date / - /<?-<?A

ADDENDUM III

•

out of the courtroom and the door is--

2

MR. YOUNGBERG:

3

that door, Judge?

4

THE COURT:

Yeah, please.

5

days are coming back to help us.

®

hallway is closed now.

M

Your bailiff

And the door to the

Mr. Youngberg, you wanted the benefit of the

8
9

Do you want me to get

record?
I

MR. YOUNGBERG:

Yes, Judge.

At this

10

point, I'd like to raise a Batsun challenge to the

11

prosecution's first two preemptory strike.

12

His strike No. 1 was of Juror No. 9, My Dang, a

13

young woman of obviously Asian descent.

14

record that on her questionnaire, there did not appear to be

15

any problems as far as her not being able to serve as a

16

juror.

17 I

I'd note for the

Likewise, on Juror No. 16, which was prosecutor
challenge No. 2, Prances Alires, another woman of--of

19

Hispanic descent; again, nothing in her questionnaire

20

indicates that she's unable to serve as a juror, positive or

21

negative.

22

x f d also like to point out for the record, Judge,

23

that the prosecutor did not question those two individuals

24

individually when he had the opportunity, and I — I

do not

25 [ have any notes of any questions being directed to those two
46
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1
2
3
4
5

jurors; but I think that that shows a prima facie Batsun
challenge, anyway, and it requires the prosecutor to give an
explanation for the striking of them.
THE COURT:

Mr. Walsh?

MR. WALSH:

Judge, with respect to the--

6

Ms. Dang, when I heard her speak, I — I was concerned about

7

the language problem.

8

I—she said she's been here six years, and I—when I

9

listened, and I didn't want to embarrass her by probing into

10

that, when I listened to her questions (sic), I thought, I'm

11

not so sure that her command of the English language is what

12

I would prefer; had nothing to do with her race.

13
14
15
16
17
18

It had nothing to do with her race,

With respect to Ms. Alires, I don't know whether
she's a minority or not.

I have another defendant by the

name of, I think Connie Fran—not Frances Alires, and in
that case, relatives of my defendant received a lot of
property from this woman who worked in an optician s h o p when I say a lot of property, she got free glasses, and I

19

didn't—and I didn't probe in there, but I thought there may

20

be some connection there with an other criminal defendant

21

that I have; consequently, I struck her.

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. YOUNGBERG:

Okay.
If I could respond to

24

the second one, Judge, on the questionnaire, there was a

25

specific question about, have you or a close friend or a
47
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family member ever been the victim of a crime?

No, she

circled no.
Have any—have you or family member been charged
with an offense?

She circled no.

I would argue that this is simply based on her
Hispanic surname and I--I would like Mr. Walsh to let me
know how many Smiths, Jonses, Cashes, Colebys, Maxwells he
also deals with criminal cases on.
And I think this is clearly based on race, Judge,
at least Hispanic surname cases.
THE COURT:
challenge.

Ifm going to deny the

I think the case law makes fairly clear that the

challenge at least has to pose race-neutral basis.

It does

not--if I remember part of the words of the Court, it
doesn't have to be a good reason, it simply has to be a
neutral reason.
I will note for the record as well that there is a
person of obvious Indian descent who did remain and was not
stricken.
MR. YOUNGBERG:

Well, he was stricken by

me, Judge, because he had a contract with the county to
provide sur—surveillance equipment to the prison.

I should

also note for the record that that individual was on my jury
panel two days ago and he was actually stricken for cause
because he indicated that he has a contractual relationship
48
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with law enforcement and would be uncomfortable serving as a
juror, so that was—that was my reason for that.
THE COURT: Okay,

Anything else that

either of you gentlemen want to put on the record?
MR. YOUNGBERG:
MR. WALSH:

No, Judge.

Judge, and let me just--I

don't even know that Alires is a—a minority name.

I mean,

I—I think Mr. Youngberg here is grasping at straws.
As I say, I have another defendant, it's the same
name and it's an unusual name, that's why I can remember
that; I can't remember all the Smiths I have, but I've only,
in my 15 years, only had one Alires, and so I do remember
that, it's an ongoing case, still pending out in Murray, so
I'm well aware of that case, so...
THE COURT: Okay.

Okay.

We'll be in

recess then, plan on starting as soon as the jurors are
ready.
Counsel, do you—how long do you expect to take
for openings?
MR. WALSH:

At most ten minutes, Judge.

MR. YOUNGBERG:

Five--five to seven

minutes probably, Judge.
THE COURT: Okay.

And then do you want

to take the first witness before lunch or do you want to
wait?* That's—or we can give the option to the jurors.
49
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ADDENDUM IV

1
2

MR. WALSH:

May the other deputies be

THE COURT:

Anything--that's right.

I excused, Judge?

3
4

We'll excuse the witnesses.

5

Anything else that needs to be placed on the

6

record?

7

MR. YOUNGBERG:

8

Judge, I--I

probably

should just put this on the record, before you leave, Dave.

9

MR. WALSH:

10

want.

Lenny, you can leave if you

Yes.

11

MR. YOUNGBERG:

I did get a copy of the

12

follow-up report today from the officer.

13

in which this apparent questioning is mentioned, that the

14

prosecutor got evidence of.

15

That's the report

It appears that the questioning was done without

16

Miranda rights, and so I would move that there be a--an

17

instruction given to the jury that they should not consider

18

that evidence.

19

you know, six months ago; but as I said, this is the first

20

day we've seen this officer's report.

21

And I apologize for not bringing this up,

It appears to be a violation of his--of his

22

Constitutional rights, Judge, in that he was not given his

23

Miranda rights prior to the questioning and so I'd ask for a

24

curative instruction.

25

THE COURT:

Okay.

I

Mr. Walsh?
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1

\

MR. WALSH:

Judge, most of what is

2

contained in that report, except what Deputy Bruno testified

3

to, did not come out until rebuttal evidence, when the

4

officer, Officer Bruno testi--or I mean Deputy Cardon; but

5

the portion about the wife and the kids being in Canada,

6

that was initially brought up when he testified, and then in

7

response to that, I questioned him about it and then asked

8

the officers to come in and impeach him.

9

of impeachment, whether there's Miranda or not, those

10
11

And for purposes

statements are admissible.
Furthermore, Judge, I don't think t h e r e ' s — a s the-

12

-as everybody's testified, this was not in response to any

13

interrogation.

14

15

M r . Bowman was just ranting and raving and

I repeating himself over and over and over again.
THE COURT:

Clearly, what Officer Cardon

16

testified to was rambling; but Officer Bruno seemed to

17

indicate that this m a y — v e r y well may have been as a result

18

of questioning after the arrest.

19

MR. WALSH:

And that's what I say. It's

20

significant, Judge, that after he's testified, if there is

2i

no Miranda, if t h e r e — e v e n assume there is no Miranda, and a

22

violation of the Miranda rights, the Court has said that

23

doesn't give him the right to take the stand and lie, and so

24

if t h e r e — i f it's used for impeachment, and that's why I

25

left it until the end, if it's used for impeachment, then
136
ALAN P. SMITH, CSR
385 BRAHMA DRIVE (801) 266-0320
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84107

a

1

I it's appropriate, whether there's Miranda or n o t .

2

T H E COURT:

Okay.

3

MR. YOUNGBERG:

And just for the record,

4

Judge, the officer's report does state, and I quote, "Mr.

5

Bowman was asked why he ran.

6

won't let him see his kids, that she lives in Toronto."

7

M r . Bowman said that his wife

Once again, M r . Bowman was asked why he ran, and

8

he stated that he was just acting out a life and that he was

9

a wild man.

10

So, it does appear to be an interrogation.

If

11

that's what the prosecutor is offering it for, then we need

12

an instruction in t h a t — f o r that, saying that it's

13

impeachment evidence only and it's not substantive evidence.

14

MR. WALSH:

Well, and I beg to differ,

15

Judge.

16

substantive evidence, and therefore, it comes in as

17

substantive evidence of what he said at that time. Y o u

18

know, and that's why I left it to the end, I didn't bring it

19

out on direct examination, the story about the kids and

20

whatever, in Canada.

21

If it's impeachment evidence, it can b e — i t ' s

So, as I say, I mean, once he's taken the stand,

22

whether there's a violation or not, he's not entitled to

23

take the stand and lie.

24

has held that if there's a violation of Miranda, if he

25

testifies, then a l l — t h e n he's fair game as to what he said.

And so that's why the Supreme Court

I
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THE COURT:

1
2

the point that you're making.

3

curative instruct ion.

4

of reasons why.

Mr. Youngberg, I understand
I'm not going to give the

Let me state for the record a couple

One, I think Mr. Walsh is correct that the law

5
6

makes that admiss•ible; but two., I think that would draw the

7

attention of the jury to the question, when I think that the

8

case that the twc> of you have ]Laid <Dut for the jury is

9

really a question[ of whether the officer did see the person

10

or not.
And it1 s for those two reasons; first, I don't

11
12

believe it's critical that they be :instructed on that, and

13

second, that it was admissible as i1t was presented.
Okay.

14
15

Anything else that needs to be placed on

the record?
No, Judge.

16

MR. YOUNGBERG:

17

MR. WALSH:

No, sir.

18

THE COURT:

Are you ready to argue about

19

it, gentlemen, or• do you need a moment?

20

MR. YOUNGBERG:

21

MR. WALSH:

Don 't need any time, Judge.

22

THE COURT:

Okay.

23
24
25

Yeah.

Let's bring them back

then.
Gene, I 'd ask you to hand out the jury
instructions, if you would, pl<*ase, sir.
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